Productivity is a word often used to explain both European (export) successes in certain sectors on the one hand, and European failure to reach US levels of productivity on the other. Europe is a global leader in a number of (high-technology) products and many countries have achieved and maintained significant export growth. How can this observation be reconciled with frequent allegations of low productivity in Europe? As to the difference to the US, in 1995, the EU had almost closed the productivity gap with the US. After that, however, the gap widened, having again narrowed a little bit in recent years. US productivity growth has been slowing steadily for more than two years. Simultaneously, the evidence has strengthened that large parts of Europe are experiencing a renaissance. How important is productivity to explain differences in growth between the two regions, or are there other factors at work? This Briefing Paper focuses on labor and product market deregulations as fundamental elements in the passage from an investment to an innovation-based economy. The approach undertaken is prominently empirical. First, we have discussed product and labor market regulations in Anglo-Saxon and European countries. Second, we have shown the correlation between product and labor market regulations. Finally, the last section of the paper was dedicated to proving the relationship between product and labor (de)regulation and economic growth. The approach has been a little unconventional, given that we have used the IMD Competitiveness Index as a proxy for the regulatory friendliness of a given country. Our empirical results have appeared to be very promising and we hope that future research with more precise data and sharper estimation techniques might be possible in the future.
Introduction
The purpose of this Briefing Paper is to discuss productivity, growth potential and monetary policy in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe vis-à-vis the United States (US). Productivity is a word often used to explain both European (export) successes in certain sectors on the one hand, and European failure to reach US levels of productivity on the other.. Europe is a global leader in a number of (high-technology) products and many countries have achieved and maintained significant export growth. How can this observation be reconciled with frequent allegations of low productivity in Europe? As to the difference to the US, in 1995, the European Uniion (EU) had almost closed the productivity gap with the US. After that, however, the gap widened, having again narrowed a little bit in recent years. US productivity growth has been slowing steadily for more than two years. Simultaneously, the evidence has strengthened that large parts of Europe are experiencing a renaissance. How important is productivity to explain differences in growth between the two regions, or are there other factors at work? Economic growth has always been at the center of any medium and long-run economic model. Unfortunately most of the factors driving it were assumed to be out of policymakers' control: demographic growth, natural endowments, capital accumulation and other exogenous forces. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, on the other hand, more and more attention has been paid to the effect of political institutions on longrun growth. A common characteristic of modern frameworks is that they identify a nonconstant relationship between growth and its drivers: according to the different developmental stages, different factors are responsible for maintaining a high and sustainable level of growth. All the theoretical and empirical frameworks recognize that structural growth is strictly associated to Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth. TFP growth increases with the number and size of innovations introduced in the market. The implication is that, ultimately, economic growth rests on two pillars:
1. The stock of skilled human capital, which guarantees an innovative and effective research output. 2. A set of economic and political institutions, which create the appropriate incentives for the agents to innovate and introduce the new technologies in the market. This Briefing Paper focuses on the second of the pillars described above and out of the many economic and political institutions we have decided to focus the attention on product and labor market deregulations. Two are the reasons: first, because we believe it is the most important element in the passage from an investment to an innovation-based economy; secondly, because the two markets are strictly interrelated and analyzing them independently would not allow for a clear understanding of the subject at hand. The approach undertaken is prominently empirical. After a very brief description of the regulatory levels of product and labor markets on the two sides of the Atlantic, we conclude with an independent study on the accuracy of the IMD competitiveness index in predicting the overall economic performance of countries close to the technological frontier. Issing (2006) lists three sets of factors as possible determinants of inflation and output growth differentials. The first includes structural factors, such as differences among countries in productivity trends, in the degree of openness and exposition to foreign shocks, in the financial structure, and in the degree of rigidities in goods and labor markets. A key role is played by the dynamics of unit labour costs. Interestingly, however, the compensation per employee component has proved to be more important than labor productivity. The second set includes cyclical factors. Differentials can arise from asymmetric shocks hitting specific economies or from asymmetric responses to common shocks. In the euro area, common shocks account for the bulk of business cycle fluctuations. Moreover, co-movement of economic activity has increased since 1999, suggesting relatively similar propagation mechanisms. Finally, country-specific shocks have small level effects on output but generate large and persistent effects on output growth differentials (see also Chapter 5 in De Haan, Eijffinger and Waller, 2005) . The third set includes policy-related factors. Inflation and output differentials can be induced by misaligned national structural or fiscal policies. It is also sometimes argued that in a currency union characterized by inflation differentials, a single monetary policy can act in a destabilizing way by strengthening inflation and output growth differentials. Issing (2006) states that in EMU there are stabilizing channels that counteract the effect of potentially diverse real interest rates. The first is a competitiveness channel: a country with lower than average inflation and higher than average real interest rates due to weak demand experiences an increase in competitiveness and in the demand of its goods, hence counteracting the initial effect of higher real interest rates. Recent research at the ECB suggests that in the euro area the real interest rate effect is stronger in the short run, while the competitiveness effect builds up slowly but prevails over the long term. The second stabilizing channel is provided by risk sharing. Within EMU capital and credit market integration enables to mitigate the effect of country-specific shocks on consumption through international diversification. This is a key mechanism that can counteract the differential welfare impact of asymmetries among members of a currency union. In the euro area, the share of idiosyncratic shocks smoothed through capital and credit markets is substantially lower than in the US. Nonetheless, it has been increasing since the early 1990s. National economic policies are according to Issing (2006) better instruments to enhance the ability of individual countries to respond to economic shocks and to divergences. Structural reforms in labor markets contribute to ensure a smooth adjustment to shocks or changing economic conditions. In this respect, the creation of EMU has fostered to some extent capital mobility by increasing cross-border flows, although further integration is warranted also to mitigate the effects of asymmetric shocks on consumption. On the contrary, labor mobility remains low between countries and regions, as well as between sectors and professions. It is important to enhance labor flexibility at the national and regional level, given the existence of differences in languages and cultures that inhibit mobility across countries. Structural policies should also aim at improving the efficiency of the price setting mechanism to reduce the persistence of inflation divergence.
Structural reforms and growth: product and labor market deregulations in Europe

Product and labor market regulations in Anglo-Saxon and European countries
Product market regulation is usually referred to as a combination of numerous elements, usually related to the degree of privatization and level of competition in a given economy. Following intuition, the more privatized and the higher the level of competition in a given market, the more it is considered deregulated. The eighties were characterized by wide regulatory divergences across countries. For example, 20-30 per cent of non-agricultural GDP of Europe, Ireland and New Zealand was produced by state-owned enterprises. The same figure for US, Japan and Switzerland oscillated around 1 and 10 per cent. Between 1984 and 1998 most of the Anglo-Saxon countries like New Zealand, United Kingdom (UK) and Australia went through a very strong process of privatization, while continental Europe, with the exception of Portugal, did not go through such a radical transformation. In the last fifteen years under consideration, the different starting points were still reflected at the end of the period. In fact, most of the Anglo-Saxon countries were already at an "advantage" compared to continental Europe and those that were not, like Ireland and New Zealand, managed to deregulate very quickly. The most recent comprehensive assessment of product market regulation is the one conducted by Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boyland (2000) . The authors identify three patterns of product-market regulation. The first group/cluster includes mostly Continental European countries. They are characterized by relatively liberal policies as far as international trade and international investments are concerned, but pursue a more interventionist and restrictive approach regarding state control and barriers to entrepreneurship (also called inward policies). The second group comprises AngloSaxon countries that have a more hands-off approach in both in-ward and out-ward oriented policies. Finally the third group is composed of relatively heterogeneous countries. Norway and Greece have very strict regulatory frameworks both inward and outward. Italy is very restrictive at home, but very open to the international markets. The opposite is for Canada. Given that labor is the main input for the production of goods and services, labor market regulation is also certainly a key element to be considered by policymakers. Labor markets are directly and indirectly affected by a large number of regulations. Here we will only consider one aspect of it, i.e. Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). The reason is that it is a very good proxy for the overall level of labor markets regulation. Furthermore, it was not possible to obtain studies embracing organically all the aspects that constitute labor market regulations, like unemployment benefits and levels of minimum wage. By EPL, it is usually meant restrictions on firing such as severance payments, mandatory notice periods, administrative procedures and delays. According to the EU's Broad Economic Policy guidelines, Member states are invited to "review employment contract regulations and, where appropriate, related costs, with the aim of promoting more jobs and striking a proper balance between flexibility and security" 2 Recent studies show that Anglo-Saxon countries like UK, US, Ireland and Canada have very liberal markets on both temporary and long-term contracts. The markets are very strictly regulated in continental Europe with countries like Italy, Germany and France having very high employment protection legislation levels in both types of contracts. Other countries like Sweden and the Netherlands score very well in temporary and relatively badly in long-term ones. Almost half of the countries enacted EPL reforms in the 8 year time-span under consideration. Apart from France, which increased the overall level of protection, all the other countries worked in the other direction. Greater attention was given to temporary contracts, most likely because of the laxer political constraints compared to the reforms that touch long-term ones. The reason stands in the fact that unions are sustained and financed by the employed workers, which are mainly under permanent working contracts: in order to provide companies for some degree of flexibility in their hiring and laying off schemes, each state had to reform the sectors of the labor market that were less defended by lobbies. Even though not optimal, this approach usually led to some benefits from an efficiency point of view. On the other hand, countries like Italy, with very strong restrictions on permanent contracts and relatively low on temporary have now a divided labor market: the young workforce is under temporary contracts while the elderly are under very safe employment conditions, with the obvious social tensions that result from it. The hope is that in the future it will be possible to diminish the EPL levels on long-term contracts all over the EU.
The correlation between product and labor market regulations
The correlation between the two variables is very important in this context as highlighted above. Unfortunately, due to the aforementioned lack of data, we are not able to conduct a study on the correlation of product and labor market institutions over time. A study demonstrating the direction of causality between the two is impossible for the same reason. Following the example of Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000) we report below the bivariate correlation between product and labor market regulations in 1998 for 21 OECD countries. Given the non-existence of indices representing the overall level of labor market regulation, following Boeri et al. and Nicoletti et al. (2000) we have decided to proxy it through the degree of EPL. The relationship is represented in the scatterplot below. The correlation coefficient "ρ" is 0,658387, which demonstrates a relatively strong bi-variate correlation. The relationship shown below has two very important implications. First, it proves that the insignificant relationship between Product Market Regulation and Unemployment/Employment can be attributed not only to a lack of explanatory power of the first on the latter, but to multi-collinearity with labor market regulation. Second, Figure 1 empirically validates one of the main findings that Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) developed theoretically: i.e. that a decrease in product market regulation naturally leads to (causes) a decrease in labor market regulation. The theoretical framework, but, is only partially demonstrated. In fact, we are not able to show the direction of causality entailed by the model, but only the fact the two variables move together. The final section of this Briefing Paper is dedicated to probably the most important relationship that policymakers care about, i.e. the one between product and labor market regulation and economic growth. 0,00 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00 6,00
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Figure 1: Product market regulation and employment protection legislation (1998)
Economic growth and product and labor market deregulations
Unfortunately, there is a serious lack of data concerning the assessment of product and labor market regulation. It was not possible to find any database that contained both measures for a sufficient number of years. As explained above, product market regulation has been analytically assessed from 1978 until 1998 at intervals of 4-5 years by Nicoletti et al. (2001) . On the other hand, labor market regulation or any of its components (EPL, minimum wages, unemployment benefits) were never assessed in an organic way for a sufficient number of years. The closer the literature has gone to this topic is the paper by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) , who study the relationship between product market regulation and productivity growth. This paper proves that productivity is increased by reforms promoting private governance and competition. Both privatization and entry liberalization are estimated to have a positive impact on productivity in all sectors. In manufacturing the second is particularly influential, because regulation limiting entry hinders the adoption of existing technologies, possibly by reducing competitive pressures, technology spillovers and the entry of new high-tech firms. The authors take these findings as a powerful interpretation of the observed recent differences in growth patterns across OECD countries, in particular between large Continental European economies and the United States. Strict product market regulations-and lack of regulatory reforms-are likely to underlie the relatively poorer productivity performance of some European countries, especially in those industries where Europe has accumulated a technology gap (e.g. ICT-related industries). These insights are certainly powerful, but two elements leave us dissatisfied with the study at hand. First, it focuses on productivity growth and not GDP per capita growth: although very close to each other, the two variables are not always equal and, for our purpose, a study using GDP per capita growth would be preferable. Secondly, it does not show the effects of labor market regulation on economic growth. To achieve a better understanding of the subject at hand, we present here two studies. The first is a cross-section analysis where we regress GDP per capita against the levels of product and labor market regulation in 2003. The second study is a bit less straightforward: we take the IMD Competitiveness Index as a proxy for product and labor market regulation and we conduct a panel data study trying to determine if changes in the regulatory environment determine differences in GDP per capita growth figures. Given the aforementioned lack of data, we have decided to run a cross-section study for the year 2003. We regress nominal GDP per capita against indicators of product and labor market regulation for 28 OECD countries according to different model specifications. As the two sectors tend to have similar regulatory levels across countries, this results in a strong multicollinearity. In order to overcome this problem, we tried to use different proxies for product and labor market regulation. For the first we used alternatively the aggregate indicator of product market regulation developed by Nicoletti et al. (2000) , "state control", "barriers to entrepreneurship" and "barriers to trade and investments". For the second we used alternatively the degree of "EPL", "strictness on individual dismissals" and "collective bargaining coverage". Unfortunately our efforts to exclude multicollinearity did not lead to any valuable result. The level of labor market regulation is significantly negatively correlated to the level of GDP per capita when used alone in the regression equation. It is instead insignificant when inserted along product market regulation and vice-versa. We certainly cannot be satisfied by these results, but the high correlation between the variables at hand makes it impossible to estimate their individual effect on GDP per capita levels. To understand the effects of product and labor market regulation we now adopt a different strategy. We use a nation's competitiveness level, as assessed by the IMD Competitiveness Index, as an instrumental variable for both product and labor market regulation.
Economic growth and the IMD Competitiveness Index
As a first step, it is fundamental to describe the methodology used by IMD in building the Competitiveness Index. The annual competitiveness rankings are composed of four subcategories: economic performance, government efficiency, business efficiency and infrastructure. For these sub-categories there are 83, 77, 69 and 94 individual criteria, respectively. The categories themselves are further broken down for a total of twenty subfactors. Each of the twenty sub-factors receives an equal weight of 5 per cent, irrespective of the number of criteria composing it. To give each of these elements a score, the IMD uses hard and soft data. The former receives a weight of two thirds and the latter accounts for the rest. The soft data originates from the so-called annual executive opinion survey. The survey is an in-depth 112-point questionnaire sent to business executives and economic experts. The empirical model to be proposed analyses the statistical relationships between the national economic performances and the composite IMD Competitiveness Index. A panel data model is used. Data were collected for 46 different countries, which include industrialized, developing and least developed countries. A list of the countries is given in Figure 2 below. In the analysis we use the entire set of countries. However, we also conducted our analysis separating the sample into industrialized and developing countries. Our findings were unaffected and therefore not reported here. The IMD Competitiveness Index was taken for ten consecutive years (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) "GDP per capita growth" was used as independent variable. The Penn World Table  database was used for the period 1950-2000. IMF data were used to integrate the successive four years. The business cycle is stripped out of the real GDP per capita growth data by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. This is done to obtain the structural growth rates, which serve as a proxy for potential economic growth of the countries in question. To have a 'clean' measure of it, the real growth rate data is smoothed over the period , even though the index data is limited to the period 1996-2004. Thus, only the part of the smoothed data, which lies within the period 1995-2004, is used. The independent variable is the "change in the absolute competitive rank from one year to the next". The changes are calculated in such a way, that an improvement in rank (i.e. a change in rank from 14 to 12) is represented by a positive number (i.e. +2). Thus, we expect to have a positive coefficient for the changes in ranks. Further on, we included lags of the changes in rankings. More precisely, they have been lagged by one, two and three periods. Simply, an improvement or decrease of competitiveness might not show up immediately in the data. It might need time to manifest itself. Country-specific and timespecific fixed effects were used. Here is the model specification adopted:
Where ∆GDP is the real growth rate per capita adjusted by the Hodrick-Prescott Filter ∆INDEX is the change in competitiveness ranking, constructed as explained above and ∆INDEX_XLAG is the index change lagged by X periods.
In Figure 3 below are reported the estimation results. The coefficient for ∆INDEX is significant up to the second lag, indicating a strong relationship between the ranking in the IMD Competitiveness Index and economic growth. Although the proxy used did not contain product and labor market regulation only, with this study we have shown the close relationship between economic growth and the friendliness of the regulatory environment. We have tried to use separate proxies for product and labor market regulation to show their independent effects on economic growth, but either they were not available for a sufficient time-span and number of countries or they were so imprecise to result insignificant. To conclude, the results of this study should be taken only as preliminary. Future research attempts should be aimed at showing the independent effects of product and labor market regulation on economic growth across countries over time. It is important to have an empirical quantification of the two to better direct future policymaking and enact reforms to maximize structural growth. 
Some conclusions
The purpose of this Briefing Paper was a deeper understanding of the relationship between economic growth and product and labor market (de)regulation. Although most of the economists believe in the positive effects of deregulation, the empirical estimations did not always prove to be completely satisfactory. First, we have discussed product and labor market regulations in Anglo-Saxon and European countries. Second, we have shown the correlation between product and labor market regulations. Finally, the last section of the paper was dedicated to proving the relationship between product and labor (de)regulation and economic growth. The approach has been a little unconventional, given that we have used the IMD Competitiveness Index as a proxy for the regulatory friendliness of a given country. Our empirical results have appeared to be very promising and we hope that future research with more precise data and sharper estimation techniques might be possible in the future.
